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Abstract: The League of Nations and the United Nations Organization were 
two post-World War (World War I and World War II) organizations 
established for the maintenance of peace and security in the international 
system. One of the cardinal objectives of these organizations was the 
promotion of a Collective Security System which was considered as vital in 
the pursuit of global peace and security. In other words, Collective Security is 
an institutional mechanism established to address a comprehensive list of 
major threats to peace and security around the world. With the escalation of 
conflicts and wars in different parts of the world, there is therefore the need 
for collective responses at global, regional and national levels in conflict 
situations. The achievement of collective security in the international system 
would be based on the principle that any attack on any member of the United 
Nations would be considered as an attack on all the members.After a 
panoramic discourse of the meaning and nature of Collective Security, the 
paper also examines the problems of collective security in the international 
system; its failure under the League of Nations and the United Nations. The 
paper concludes that the weaknesses inherent in the system do not make it 
unuseful as it is a relevant factor in the maintenance of international peace 
and security.  
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INTRODUCTION  
World War I pointed out a fundamental flaw in the balance of power 
system. When the system failed, the result was dangerous and 
catastrophic. The incredible levels of destruction in the war led most 
nation-states to reject a balance of power system as the basis for 
international security in the post-World War I. Instead, the victorious 
states sought to institutionalize a system of collective security via the 
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League of Nations in which aggression by one state would bring 
response from all states; collective security would thus be achieved. 
The achievement of this “collective security” would be based 
on the principle that an attack on one is an attack on all. Any state 
contemplating aggression would face the sure prospect of struggle not 
simply with the prospective victim, but with all other members of the 
system, who would make any necessary sacrifice to save the state 
attacked. In a hypothetical world of collective security, the assumption 
is that the members of the system will have such an overwhelming 
preponderance of power that will be so unreservedly committed to the 
principles they have endorsed that aggression will become quite 
irrational; presumably, it will not occur or if it should occur, it will be 
defeated. The League of Nations and the United Nations are two post-
World War (first and second World Wars) agencies under which the 
collective security system has been used as machinery for joint action 
for the prevention or counter of any attack against an established 
international order. 
The objective of collective security is to frustrate any attempt 
by states to change the status quo with overwhelming force because a 
change in the status quo entails a change to the world order of 
independent sovereign states. This was meant to muster overpowering 
collective force, which could threaten and then applied to end 
aggression by revisionist states and other would-be aggressors.  
 
MEANING AND NATURE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY  
According to George Schwarzeberger, collective security is a 
“machinery for joint action in order to prevent or counter any attack 
against an established international order” (schwarzenberger, 
1951).The term implies collective measures for dealing with threat to 
peace. 
Van Dyke (1957) sees collective security as a system in which 
a number of states are bound to engage in collective efforts on behalf 
of each other’s individual security. To A. K. Chaturvedi (2006), 
collective security is “an arrangement arrived at by some nations to 
protect their vital interests, safety or integrity, against a probable threat 
or menace over a particular period, by means of combining their 
powers.” 
In his conceptual clarification, Onyemaechi Eke (2007) sees the 
concept of collective security as “an idealist one which hinges on the 
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force by member states to deter aggression or, by implication, to 
launch a reprisal attack capable of defeating the recalcitrant member.” 
According to him, collective security “connotes the institutionalization 
of a global police force against abuse of order and breaches, which can 
lead to insecurity. It is an arrangement in which all states cooperate 
collectively to provide security for all by the actions of all against any 
state within the groups which might challenge the existing order by 
using force. By employing a system of collective security, the United 
Nations hopes to dissuade any member state from acting in a manner 
likely to threaten peace, thereby avoiding conflict. 
From the above definitions by these eminent scholars, 
collective security can then be seen as a plan for maintaining peace 
through an organization of sovereign states, whose members pledge 
themselves to defend each other against attack. The concept is best 
seen as “security for individual nation by collective means”, that is, by 
membership in an international organization made up of all or most of 
the states of the world pledged to defend each other from attack. The 
idea of collective security was extensively discussed during the World 
War I, and it took shape in the 1919 Covenant of the League of 
Nations, and again in the Charter of the United Nations after Word 
War II. 
According to Palmer and Perkings (2007), “a collective 
security system, to be effective, must be strong enough to cope with 
aggression from any power or combination of powers, and it must be 
invoked if and as aggression occurs.” The principle of collective 
security involves a willingness to apply sanctions as and when 
necessary and even to go to war. Collective security will never work 
unless all the nations that take part in it are prepared simultaneously to 
threaten with sanctions and to fight, if necessary, an aggressor. It must 
be open to those states which are willing to accept its obligations in 
good faith. 
Rourke and Boyer (1998) assert that collective security is based 
on four principles: first, all countries forswear the use of force except 
in self defence; second, all agree that peace is indivisible, an attack on 
one is an attack on all; third, all pledge to unite to halt aggression and 
restore the peace; fourth, all agree to supply whatever material or 
personnel resources that are necessary to form a collective security 
force associated with the United Nations or some IGO to defeat 
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The principle of collective security is found in Article 48 and 
49 of the Charter of the United Nations which states that, “the action 
required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the 
maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all 
the members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security 
Council may determine; such decisions shall be carried out by the 
members of the United Nations directly or through their action in the 
appropriate international agencies of which they are members.” 
The idea behind the collective security system is that members 
of the organization advancing the collective security system (this time, 
the United Nations) are bound to spring to each other’s defense in case 
of attack. The basic principle is that an attack on one is an attack on all. 
Any state contemplating aggression would face the sure prospect of 
struggle not simply with the prospective victim, but with all other 
members of the system, who would make any necessary sacrifice to 
save the state attacked. 
“In a hypothetical world of collective security, the assumption 
is that the members of the system will have such an overwhelming 
preponderance of power and will be so unreservedly committed to the 
principles they have endorsed that aggression will become quite 
irrational; presumably, it will thus not occur, or if it should occur, it 
will be defeated.” (Dyke, 1957)  
 
PROBLEMS OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY  
At the twilight of World War I, many political thinkers thought and 
hoped that the states of the world would make the League of Nations a 
collective security system that would maintain international peace and 
security, and some had the same hope after World War II in connection 
with the United Nations. Karen Mingst averred that collective security 
is borne out of some salient assumptions. These assumptions are that: 
wars are prevented by restraint of military action; aggressors must be 
stopped; the aggressor is easily identified; the aggressor is always 
wrong; aggressors know that the international community will act 
against them (Mingst, 1999). As asserted by Van Dyke (1957), “they 
wanted states to abandon narrow conceptions of self interest as a guide 
to policy and to regard themselves as units in a world society having an 
interest in preserving law and order everywhere.” These ideas 
expressed by these scholars could not work out as a result of numerous 
problems associated with the concept of collective security. There are 
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misguided. They see it as conceptually muddled and naively 
unrealistic. Although they are pledged to defend each other, many 
countries will refuse to do so, if such an act is not in their own best 
interests or thought to be too risky or expensive. In addition, they 
argue that collective security arrangements will turn small struggles 
into large ones, and prevent the use of alternative (non-violent) 
problem solving, relying instead on the much more costly approach of 
military confrontation. In addition, there is always a danger that 
alliances formed by the purpose of collective security can also serve as 
a basis for an aggressive coalition. Other problems associated with the 
collective security system are discussed as follows: 
(i)  States do not regard themselves as members of one society 
having a common vital interest in protecting and preserving 
each other’s rights. Does it really matter to Japan if Paraguay 
and Bolivia destroy themselves in a war? Of what interest is it 
to Nigeria if Egypt should attack Tunisia and such attack is 
repelled or defeated? There is no doubt that states have 
demonstrated a willingness to ally themselves with certain 
other selected states and thus to pledge to defend certain 
selected frontiers in addition to their own, but the principle of 
“one for all and all for one” does not commend itself. 
(ii)  Another challenge to collective security is that its risks are 
great. Governments of nation-states can enforce law against 
individuals with little risk or fear. Internationally, however, the 
situation is quite different. Disparities of power are much 
greater. “Theoretically, it might be easy for a world society to 
defeat aggression by a smaller power like Nigeria, but what if 
one of the great powers turns aggressor?” it is one thing for a 
government to enforce a law against a hapless individual and 
another thing for the United Nations to try to enforce the law 
against a state which may be almost as strong as the rest of the 
world combined. The development of nuclear weapons makes 
the problem all the greater. An aggressor with such weapons 
could virtually wipe from the face of the earth a number of the 
members of the collective security system. Faced with such a 
possibility, a member whose own most vital interest was 
directly threatened might choose proud defiance rather than 
surrender. But a member whose own vital interests were not 
directly threatened would be unlikely to be so bold. Nor do 
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risks, regardless of the identity of the aggressor and of his 
victim. 
(iii)  Jones (1985) and Rostow (1968) cited in Eke (2007) are in 
agreement that the principles of the United Nations veto is “a 
great inhibition to the smooth and effective functioning of the 
Security Council collective security system. In his observation, 
Rostow argued that “part of the problem is that the 
responsibility of world peace was resting on the shoulders of 
nations with preponderant military and political power.” By 
this, he meant those nations that could become arrogant to 
ignore local wars, revolutions, or conquests on the assumption 
that they do not disturb the general equilibrium of power or 
endanger the sense of security of the system as a whole. 
The veto principle of the Security Council of the United 
Nations was originally meant to ensure commitment of the five 
permanent members to the United Nations. It was also meant 
that no superpower is against any UN action, which can lead to 
outbreak of hostilities (Butler, 1999). The superpowers were 
expected to exercise collective responsibility for the 
maintenance of global peace and security. But what we see 
today has been unilateral actions by some permanent members 
of the Security Council with veto powers, especially the United 
States and Great Britain against countries they perceive as 
threats to international peace and security. A good example is 
the invasion of Iraq by the United States and Britain, “this 
wave of American-styled security by domination in place of 
collective security creates both anxiety and curiosity over the 
weakness of the United Nations Collective Security as “sine 
qua non” for world peace and security. 
(iv)  The activities of powerful regional organizations have posed a 
serious problem to United Nations Collective Security System. 
“Experience has shown that members of such organizations 
demonstrate divided loyalty often times with more concern to 
the regional organization than the UN.” (Eke, 2007) Members 
of regional security have often abandoned the UN Collective 
Security System in preference to regional security system. 
Bulter observed that during the invasion of Iraq by the United 
States “the Security Council – the hub of collective security 
regime was bypassed, defied and abused…” (Butler, 1999). 
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powers, in their attitudes of placing more emphasis on national 
and regional defence than on collective security as the 
obligation to the Charter of the United Nations are fundamental 
problems of unanimity of the Council and by extension, the 
cause of failure of security regime. (Palmer and Perkins, 2007) 
In many instances of states and regional conflicts, members of 
regional security abandon the UN. For example, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) had helped to bury the optimism, which 
greeted the UN Collective Security System in the 78-day bombing of 
Yugoslavia, and of course Iraq, after the fall of Soviet empire. In these 
two crises situation, the Security Council which is the hub of collective 
security regime was bypassed. The double allegiance of members of 
the United Nations, especially by the veto-wielding ones, concretely 
depicts moral failure.  
 
FAILURE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY UNDER THE LEAGUE 
OF NATIONS  
Palmer and Perkings observed that the League of Nations was a 
complete failure as an instrument for enforcement of collective 
security. They cited the failure of the United States of America to join 
the League from the start and the rise of the Soviet Union outside the 
League as one of the major reasons why the League failed as 
instrument for the development and enforcement of collective security. 
They also believed that “the open defiance of Japan, Italy and 
Germany combined to destroy any hopes that the League would be 
effective in major international crisis.” (Palmer and Perkings, 2007) 
This line of thought was also captured by Charles, Kegley. He posits 
that “the failure stemmed from the U.S. refusal to join the 
organization; the other great powers’ fear that the League’s collective 
strength might be used against them. (Kegley, 2007) 
Another example of the failure of the League of Nations’ 
collective security is the Manchurian crisis when Japan occupied part 
of China. After the invasion, members of the League passed a 
resolution calling for Japan to withdraw or face severe penalties. Given 
that every nation on the League of Nations Council had veto power, 
Japan promptly vetoed the resolution, severely limiting the League of 
Nations’ ability to respond. After two years of deliberation, the League 
passed a resolution condemning the invasion without committing the 
League’s members to any action against it. The Japanese replied by 
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A similar process occurred in 1935, when Italy invaded 
Ethiopia. Sanctions were passed, but Italy would have vetoed any 
stronger resolution. Additionally, Britain and France sought to court 
Italy’s government as a potential deterrent to Hitler, given that 
Mussolini was not in what would become the Axis Alliance of World 
War II. Thus, neither enforced any serious sanctions against the Italian 
government. 
Karen Mingst argued that Collective Security does not always 
work. She observed that the inability of the international community to 
respond to Japan’s invasion of Manchuria and Italy’s assault on 
Ethiopia was the fundamental differences in state interests and 
ideologies. According to her, “Collective Security does not always 
work. In the period between the two world wars, Japan invaded 
Manchuria and Italy overran Ethiopia. In neither case did other states 
act as if it were in their collective interest to respond…. In this 
instance, collective security did not work because of lack of 
commitment on the part of other states and an unwillingness of the 
International Community to act in concert. In the post-World War II 
era, Collective Security could not work because of fundamental 
differences in both state interests and ideologies.” (Mingst, 1999)  
Additionally, in this case and with the Japanese invasion of 
Manchuria, the absence of the USA from the League of Nations 
deprived the League of another major power that could have used 
economic leverage against either of the aggressors states. Inaction by 
the League subjected it to criticisms that it was weak and concerned 
more with European issues (most leading members were Europeans) 
and did not deter Hitler from his plans to dominate Europe.  
 
FAILURE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY UNDER THE UNITED 
NATIONS  
While Article I of the UN Charter calls for “effective collective 
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and 
for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of peace,” 
Article 43 of the Charter provides that members of the UN, in 
accordance with special agreements to be conducted, are to make 
available to the Security Council “armed forces, assistance and 
facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of 
maintaining international peace and security.” These shall take place 
“if the Security Council finds that an act of aggression or other threats 
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with such measures as the Council shall deem necessary…” (Palmer 
and Perkings, 2007)  
The United Nations calls for necessary measures to maintain 
international peace and security, including the obligation of states to 
place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed power necessary for 
an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of 
armaments. Rather than have an institutionalized collective security 
regime, under the U.N. regularized training, maintenance and 
command, loosely Collective Security mechanism took the force of 
multinational willingness to control troops to promote the U.N. peace 
agenda. Where there exists an aggressor, there is need to collectively 
counter the attacks of the aggressor and preserve the peace through a 
Collective Security system. In such a situation no member state of the 
United Nations can claim neutrality, and none would dare to support 
the aggressor. If the aggressor dares to use force, then the combined 
forces of all the other states should so overwhelm the aggressor that 
hostilities would terminate and would cause would-be aggressor to 
retrace its steps for fear of sanction.  
One of the problems of the United Nations Collective Security 
system is the unwillingness of countries to subordinate their sovereign 
interests to collective action. “Thus far, governments have generally 
maintained their right to view conflict in terms of their national interest 
and to support or oppose UN action based on their nationalistic point 
of view. Collective Security therefore exists mostly as a goal, not as a 
general practice.” (Rourke and Boyer, 1998)  
Another problem which have resulted in the failure of the 
United Nations Collective Security system is the overdependence of 
the Security Council on the member-governments for assistance, 
especially the United States, Britain, Germany, Japan, etc. This 
overdependence has made these nations act unilaterally in conflict 
situations without approval of the Security Council of the United 
Nations. In some situations, they flout the orders of the Security 
Council not to act unilaterally. The Iraq crisis and the role of the 
coalition forces, which was molded by the United States and Britain is 
clearer example. “Rather than seek the global interest of peace and 
security through stability in Iraq and the Middle East region, the 
domination oriented members amassed their vast economic, diplomatic 
and military resources, captured and brazenly subjugated Iraq to an 
unprecedented condominial regime serving their economic interest 
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This goes to show that the big powers of the world will only 
agree to cooperate with the United Nations in relation to collective 
security as long as it serves their interests. “The larger powers (who, 
after all, must bear the major burdens of enforcing peace under a 
collective security system) have never been willing to give an 
unconditional commitment to carry out the commands of the world 
organization; they have always reserved for themselves some escape 
hatch. They have never been willing to set up an international army of 
any significant strength, under direct control of the League of Nations 
or the United Nations without any strings attached.”  
Some scholars see the United Nations Collective Security as 
one-sided system whereby lesser and medium powers are ignored 
during aggression. They argue that the United Nations has not 
completely applied the Principle of Collective Security on a universal 
scale. To them, collective security would be meaningful only if it 
applied to great as well as lesser powers. Thus these scholars have 
overly criticized the unrepresentative stature of the Security Council. 
They question the non inclusion of any African country in the 
membership of the UN Security Council considering the fact 
that Africa makes about one third membership of the U.N. The lack of 
geographical spread of members of the Security Council, no doubt, has 
a negative effect on the function and strength of the Council on the role 
of maintenance of global peace and security. The major issue here is 
that such members that feel their voices are only heard but of no policy 
consequence in protecting their interest feel withdrawn in U.N. actions 
of Collective Security. According to George Schwarzenberger, 
“Collective Security as understood at Dumbarton Oaks and San 
Francisco meant collective security against danger to peace from the 
middle powers and small states and collective insecurity in the face of 
aggression by any of the world powers.”  
The above observation is corroborated by Inis Claude who 
asserts that “in the final analysis, the San Francisco Conference must 
be described as having repudiated the doctrine of Collective Security 
as the foundation for a general, universally applicable system for the 
management of power in international relations. The doctrine was 
given ideological lip service, and a scheme was contrived for making it 
effective in cases of relatively minor importance. But the new 
organization reflected the conviction that the concept of Collective 
Security has no realistic relevance to the problems posed by conflict 
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On the other hand, the concerted action of the United Nations 
in the Korean Crisis of the 1950 proved that Collective Security under 
the United Nations was possible. The enforcement action undertaken 
by the United Nations against North Korea that invaded South Korea 
in 1950 marks the first time the organized community of nations in 
accordance with the principles of Collective Security, has employed 
armed forces against an aggressor.  
When the United Nations found out that North Korea exhibited 
aggression against South Korea, it called upon members of the United 
Nations to send troops and other assistance to South Korea and it asked 
the United States President to designate a Supreme Commander of the 
UN Forces. Thus the United Nations demonstrated that even though it 
had no armed forces at its disposal, as provided for in Article 43 of the 
Charter, it was not impotent in the face of open aggression.  
But critics argued that the enforcement of UN action against 
North Korea was possible only because the Soviet delegate at the time 
was boycotting the meetings of the Security Council. They argued that 
had he been present, he presumably would have vetoed any action 
against North Korea. To them, the action of the United States and of 
other United Nations members who supported enforcement actions 
does not necessarily reflect a commitment to resist aggression simply 
out of belief that the Principle of Collective Security deserved support. 
One of such critics is Arnold Wolfers who submitted that “instead of 
being a case of nations fighting any aggressor anywhere and for no 
other purpose than to punish aggression and to deter potential 
aggressors, intervention in Korea was an act of collective military 
defense against the recognized number-one enemy of the United States 
and of all countries which associated themselves with its action.” 
(Wolfers, 1962)  
These critics believed that, had South Korea been the 
aggressor, it seems unlikely that the non-communist states in the 
United Nations would have endorsed enforcement action for the 
benefit of the communist regime in North Korea.  
 
CONCLUSION  
Collective Security as an institutionalized mechanism for the 
maintenance of international peace and security has reduced tensions 
among states in the international community. It has done much by 
providing the framework for keeping conflicts from becoming major 
threats to international peace. As Palmer and Perkings pointed out, for AGATHOS: An International Review of the Humanities and Social Sciences      139 
Collective Security to be effective, it must be strong enough to cope 
with aggression from any power or combination of powers, and it must 
be invoked if and as aggression occurs.  
The direction of the United Nations Collective Security 
system has always been dictated by the world big powers especially 
the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Small and 
medium powers feel left out in the Collective Security arrangement as 
they can only benefit from the system only when the interests of any of 
the “big gives” especially the United States are at stake.  
However, its weakness does not dismiss the system as wholly 
unuseful. The UN Collective Security system remains relevant and 
needed, but its radical defects must be attended to by admitting the 
added duty to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and 
terrorism, which were not initially conceived and by enlarging the 
Security Council to take care of political interests of states perceived as 
orchestrating these new security challenges “since collective security 
system has always remained an idealistic concept which has never 
been defined by treaty and, therefore, can be hijacked by the powerful 
nations in the lopsided United Nations Security Council.  
It is of great importance therefore, to harp on the need to 
institute a confidence-building measure among the members of the 
United Nations so as to establish the requisite solidarity and 
cooperation for enduring global peace and security. To do this is to 
start genuine reforms as currently canvassed by member states of the 
United Nations; especially those of them from Asia, Latin America and 
Africa with enlargement and representation of the Security Council 
based on geographical location and power-relations.  
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